

# Analysis of the Legitimacy of the EU's Anti-Subsidy Investigation into Chinese New Energy Vehicles and Its Normative Implications

Zhiling Liu

China Institute of Boundary and Ocean Studies, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, Hubei Province, China

## ABSTRACT

In October 2023, the European Union formally initiated an anti-subsidy investigation into Chinese new energy vehicles under the Anti-Subsidy Regulation (EU) 2016/1037. In October 2024, it issued a final ruling imposing a five-year anti-subsidy duty on electric vehicles imported from China. This paper analyzes the legal basis and procedures of the investigation, examining its conflicts with the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) and multilateral trade rules. It argues that the EU's actions risk exceeding its authority and violating international law. The investigation breaches numerous fundamental WTO principles, and China's subsidy policies do not fall under the subsidy categories defined by the SCM Agreement. Factually, the EU disregards that the competitiveness of China's new energy vehicles stems from inherent strengths within the industry itself. Procedurally, the EU's investigation process is unfair and non-transparent, failing to sincerely facilitate bilateral negotiations and consultations. It violates procedural justice in terms of investigation initiation, procedural participation, and procedural disclosure. The EU's anti-subsidy investigation, aimed at industrial protection, may generate a series of adverse effects. This holds significant implications for the overseas expansion of China's new energy vehicles and international subsidy governance rules. This paper will also propose a series of policy recommendations.

## KEYWORDS

Subsidy regulation; New energy vehicles; European Union

## 1. INTRODUCTION

In October 2023, the EU formally issued an official notice initiating an anti-subsidy investigation under Article 10(8) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1037 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the Anti-Subsidy Regulation). This action was prompted by allegations that imports of electric vehicles originating from China, which received subsidies, caused injury to the EU industry. Following sampling, questionnaire surveys, and China-EU consultations, the EU issued its final ruling on October 29, 2024, imposing a five-year definitive countervailing duty on imported Chinese electric vehicles (BEVs). Subsequent consultations and negotiations between the parties, including China's proposal for minimum price commitments, ultimately failed to reach consensus. This case not only signifies the EU's intensified unilateralism in trade remedies but also reflects a policy shift in addressing emerging industrial competition—namely, using legal means to safeguard internal market competitiveness and reshape global industrial chain rules. Against the backdrop of global green transition and industrial upgrading, the new energy vehicle (NEV) sector has become a focal point of international competition and trade friction. The EU's proactive initiation of investigations under its Anti-Subsidy Regulation and subsequent imposition of high tariffs essentially raise

questions of alignment and conflict with international legal norms. This prompts a series of issues warranting in-depth examination: Does the EU's practice of initiating investigations under the Anti-Subsidy Regulation comply with procedural and substantive requirements for subsidy investigations under the WTO legal framework? From China's perspective, how should it leverage WTO dispute settlement mechanisms alongside bilateral and regional negotiation frameworks within the international legal system to safeguard its industrial security and international voice? This study systematically analyzes the EU's anti-subsidy investigation against Chinese new energy vehicles, revealing potential risks of violating international law. Simultaneously, it offers insights for China and other emerging economies in establishing lawful, transparent subsidy policies and defense mechanisms within the international legal framework. (Wang, 2021)

## **2. LEGAL ASSESSMENT OF THE EU'S ANTI-SUBSIDY INVESTIGATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW**

This paper challenges the legitimacy of the EU's anti-subsidy investigation into China's new energy vehicles from three perspectives: legal basis, factual basis, and procedural fairness. First, regarding legal basis, the EU's investigation reflects "double standards," violating fundamental WTO principles of non-discrimination and fair trade. Moreover, China's subsidy policies are lawful and do not fall under the types of subsidies subject to countervailing measures under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM). Second, factual evidence indicates that the competitive edge of China's new energy vehicles stems from the industry's inherent strengths, rendering the EU's investigation unfounded. Third, procedural aspects reveal that the EU failed to meet fundamental requirements of procedural justice in initiating the investigation, ensuring procedural participation, and maintaining transparency, resulting in an opaque and unfair process.

### **2.1. Inconsistency with Fundamental WTO Principles and the Emergence of Double Standards**

The EU's anti-subsidy investigation into China's new energy vehicles violates fundamental WTO principles such as non-discrimination, trade liberalization, and the prevention of protectionism.

On the surface, the EU's relevant anti-subsidy regulations and investigations appear to apply to all enterprises and countries engaged in trade with the EU. However, in practice, they are frequently applied only to a handful of specific enterprises and nations, resulting in discriminatory treatment toward certain countries and businesses. In reality, the EU's anti-subsidy investigations exhibit a pronounced "double standard." (Diebold & Nicolas, 2011) Subsidizing green energy is a common practice among nations. The EU frequently initiates anti-subsidy investigations against China while turning a blind eye to subsidies from other nations like the United States.

In Part III of the Preliminary Determination (COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2024/1866 of 3 July 2024, 2024/1866), the EU cites numerous Chinese documents and policies, concluding that China's overall economic system is characterized by exceptionally strong state involvement, thereby constituting a state-dominated political entity. Consequently, financial institutions like banks are designated as "public entities" providing subsidies. Additionally, bank-issued bonds and discounted bills are categorized as "subsidies," alongside support in land allocation and technology transfer. The EU asserts that since 2010, the Chinese government has consistently emphasized accelerated support for the new energy vehicle sector. It has issued documents such as the "Energy-Saving and New Energy Vehicle Industry Development Plan (2012-2020)" and the "Guiding Opinions on Accelerating the Promotion and Application of New Energy Vehicles," explicitly committing to provide financial and other forms of support to designated projects and sectors.

The new energy vehicle subsidy policy is in fact universal in nature. Moreover, developed countries such as the United States and Europe have long implemented relevant subsidy measures, supporting the new energy vehicle industry through multiple channels including fiscal and tax policies. (Knez & Obrecht, 2017) According to the International Energy Agency, in 2013, the U.S. Department of Energy released the Electric Vehicle Deployment Plan Blueprint. Bolstered by these subsidy policies, the U.S. new energy vehicle market rapidly expanded its global share, surging from under 20% to nearly 50% in just three years. This propelled the U.S. past Japan to become the world's largest new energy vehicle market while simultaneously eroding the global market shares of other nations. In 2022, the U.S. enacted the Inflation Reduction Act, offering new energy vehicles incentives of up to \$7,500 and specifying tax credit amounts. (Gao & Jin, 2021) In 2023, the EU announced the Green Deal Industrial Plan, committing \$369 billion in tax breaks for investments in renewable energy, zero-emission vehicles, and other sectors, accelerating funding disbursement. In 2023, the Net-Zero Industry Act was proposed to bolster support for net-zero industries including wind turbines and electric vehicles, outlining seven pillar actions covering investment promotion, market access, and technical support. (Lee, 2023)

The EU ignored its own and other countries' new energy vehicle subsidy policies, targeting only China with anti-subsidy investigations—a move that clearly demonstrates its selectivity and discriminatory nature. At its core, the EU perceives China's rapid NEV development as a threat. By leveraging anti-subsidy investigations, it seeks to hinder China's industrial progress and buy more time for its own NEV sector.

## **2.2. Legitimacy of China's Industrial and Subsidy Policies under WTO Framework**

In its analysis, the European Commission fundamentally rejected China's market economy status, applying subjective biases rather than objective facts and evidence to perpetuate prejudices and stereotypes about China's economic system. It concluded that the government exercises significant control over all aspects of national economic activity, rendering it incapable of functioning as a rational market and instead constituting an extension of government planning. Various planning documents and policy instruments were treated as evidence of subsidies. It equates financial institutions' compliance with legal requirements to "government control," denying their operational independence. Even if banks were deemed "state-owned," this alone does not qualify them as "public bodies." Banks operate independently in a market-oriented manner without exercising public authority. In calculating lending rates, the Commission used foreign quotas as benchmarks, resulting in excessively high calculation bases.

China's subsidy policy is lawful and does not constitute a prohibited or actionable subsidy under the SCM Agreement that would trigger countervailing measures. Theoretically, the nature of green subsidies remains contentious. Particularly for developing countries, the "double standards" applied by developed nations toward green subsidies effectively undermine the interests of developing nations. Appropriate "green exemptions" should be established for environmental subsidies.

Under the SCM Agreement, subsidies primarily involve two fundamental elements: first, the government provides financial assistance or support; second, enterprises thereby gain an advantage. Subsidies are mainly categorized into non-actionable subsidies, prohibited subsidies, and actionable subsidies. (Wang, 2015)

First, China's subsidies do not constitute prohibited subsidies. Article 3 of the SCM Agreement defines prohibited subsidies as conditional subsidies contingent on export performance or import substitution. China's subsidy policies primarily target the domestic market, bearing no direct relation to imports or exports, and are not contingent on export performance or import substitution. China's subsidy policies provide domestic consumers with reductions in purchase taxes and other levies, while promoting the use of new energy vehicles in specific areas such as domestic infrastructure

development and public transportation. These measures aim to encourage the development of China's domestic new energy vehicle industry and do not seek to interfere with import or export markets.

Second, China's subsidy policy does not constitute actionable subsidies because it lacks specificity. Under Article 2.1 of the SCM Agreement, specificity is categorized into legal specificity and factual specificity. Legal specificity (nominal specificity) under subparagraph (1) refers to legislation granting the subsidy authority or action that explicitly limits subsidy eligibility to specific enterprises, industries, or groups of enterprises or industries. Subparagraph (2) stipulates that a subsidy is not considered specific if the legislation establishes objective criteria or conditions for eligibility and the amount of the subsidy, provided that strict adherence to these criteria and conditions automatically qualifies the recipient for the subsidy once met. (Park, 2012) China's subsidy policy for new energy vehicles sets objective technical requirements and standards, allowing subsidies to be obtained upon meeting the relevant criteria. A series of documents, including the 2020 New Energy Vehicle Promotion Subsidy Program and Product Technical Requirements, clearly and objectively define the standards and technical requirements for subsidies on new energy passenger vehicles and buses. The Notice on Further Improving the Fiscal Subsidy Policy for the Promotion and Application of New Energy Vehicles explicitly states that "any vehicle meeting the technical threshold requirements of the subsidy policy is eligible for subsidies as prescribed," satisfying the provisions of subparagraph (2) of Article 2.1.

Item (3), known as factual specificity, serves as an effective supplement to legal specificity. Item (3)'s factual specificity requires consideration of: the quantity of subsidies received and whether they are used by a limited number of specific enterprises; the distribution of subsidy benefits and whether it causes resource misallocation through dominant use by specific enterprises or disproportionately large subsidies to specific enterprises; the manner in which the granting authority exercised discretion when awarding subsidies, including whether it excluded applications from other eligible entities; the diversity of economic activities within the granting authority's jurisdiction; and the duration of the subsidy program's implementation. The EU considers that only specific enterprises receive subsidies, while in fact, incentive policies are widely present in the economy. Among the enterprises receiving subsidies, besides domestic companies, foreign and joint-venture enterprises such as Tesla and Dongfeng Honda also receive China's new energy subsidies. According to the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology's public notice on the 2020–2022 subsidy fund advance allocations, Tesla is slated for over 120 million yuan in advance funds, Dongfeng Honda for an estimated 75.6 million yuan, and SAIC-GM-Wuling for an anticipated 200 million yuan. Clearly, China's subsidies are not confined to domestic enterprises and do not constitute specific subsidies, but rather provide relatively widespread policy support for the new energy vehicle industry.

### **2.3. Lack of Factual Grounds: The Competitiveness of China's NEV Industry Originates from Endogenous Advantages**

Fundamentally, the growing market recognition of Chinese new energy vehicles in the EU stems precisely from the industry's inherent competitive strengths. China has maintained the world's top position in new energy vehicle production and sales for consecutive years. (Gao & Jin, 2021) A complete and mature industrial chain has reduced production costs, granting Chinese new energy vehicles a significant price advantage over locally produced European counterparts. (Gong, 2022) China has built core capabilities in areas such as power battery systems, new chassis architectures, and intelligent driving systems. By establishing a complete industrial chain supply system in market competition, it offers consumers diverse choices, naturally making its products popular.

The EU disregards the competitive edge of China's new energy vehicle industry, which stems from its developmental strengths. Concerned that Chinese new energy vehicles threaten its domestic enterprises, the EU stated that Chinese new energy vehicles are priced approximately 30% lower than the EU average, causing harm to the EU industry. However, it deliberately overlooks how China's

new energy vehicle industry chain reduces production costs. Furthermore, its analysis fails to segment the market, instead using import prices as the basis for determining market sales prices, resulting in a biased assessment. Moreover, industry competition inherently benefits consumers and facilitates the EU's own industrial transformation and upgrading. By leveraging legal and policy measures to implement industrial protection, it seeks to secure greater market space for domestic EU enterprises, thereby safeguarding the development and international competitiveness of its local industries.

## **2.4. Deficiencies in Transparency and Procedural Fairness in the EU Investigation**

Procedural justice has become a universally recognized fundamental legal principle, requiring fairness and rationality in legal procedures during dispute resolution and ensuring respect for the rights of all parties involved. The EU's current anti-subsidy investigation fails to meet basic procedural justice requirements in terms of investigation initiation, procedural participation, and procedural transparency.

First, the EU failed to meet procedural justice requirements in initiating the investigation. It proactively launched the inquiry without disclosing relevant evidence and neglected to engage in good-faith consultations with China. This investigation was initiated without receiving any complaints, imposing a higher evidentiary standard than investigations triggered by complaints. Under Article 11.6 of the SCM Agreement, an EU self-initiated investigation must demonstrate three essential elements: the existence of a subsidy, the occurrence of injury, and a causal link. Furthermore, there must be "sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of the investigation." However, regarding these three elements, the EU merely asserted in its notification that evidence existed without actually providing it, resulting in a lack of transparency throughout the process.

Pursuant to Articles 4, 7, and 9 of the SCM Agreement, any Member that has reason to believe another Member is granting or maintaining a subsidy may request consultations with the subsidizing Member. Under Article 7.2 of the SCM Agreement, if a subsidy is deemed to "cause injury to the domestic industry of another Member," the request for consultations must include a statement outlining: the existence and nature of the subsidy, and available evidence of injury to the domestic industry. However, the EU hastily initiated this investigation, demanding negotiations and consultations with China within an extremely short timeframe without providing substantive evidence, thereby undermining China's procedural rights. The tight schedule and intensive arrangements have made it impossible to fully safeguard China's right to present statements and defenses. The European Commission demanded that China comment on a 177-page disclosure document and submit statements for a hearing within 10 days, effectively depriving China of its right to defend itself.

## **3. ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACTS OF THE EU INVESTIGATION**

### **3.1. Market Access Barriers for China's NEV Industry in the EU**

First, in the short term, the anti-subsidy investigation may impact exports from China's new energy vehicle industry, hindering the entry of Chinese new energy vehicles into the European market. Based on past investigation outcomes, EU anti-dumping/anti-subsidy investigations against China often result in unfavorable rulings for Chinese industries, potentially involving a series of so-called countervailing measures such as high tariffs. According to the draft ruling, while slightly reduced overall compared to the preliminary determination, the measures will still impose greater export pressure on Chinese new energy vehicle manufacturers. This will significantly increase the cost of exports to Europe for Chinese companies and undermine market expectations. It is evident that if these tariff measures are implemented, the EU will inflict substantial damage on China's new energy vehicle industry.

### **3.2. Spillover Effects and the Risk of Regulatory Imitation**

The EU's anti-subsidy investigation carries spillover effects that may trigger a coordinated response. (Jiang, 2022) First, this policy could prompt the EU to extend anti-subsidy probes to other Chinese industries, further leveraging its available tools for industrial protection and evolving into a "combination of measures." Second, the EU's anti-subsidy investigation against China may prompt other nations to follow suit, joining the ranks of those launching anti-dumping or anti-subsidy investigations into Chinese products. On May 14, 2024, the United States announced it would increase tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles to 100%. In June 2024, Turkey declared it would impose an additional 40% import tariff on Chinese automobiles. Third, the EU seeks to expand the reach of its subsidy rules and increase its influence in reforming international trade regulations. Since 2016, the EU has systematically adjusted its competition policy, continuously broadening its regulatory scope and influence while strengthening the authority of its regulatory bodies, granting EU regulators greater autonomy.

### **3.3. Adverse Effects on China-EU Economic and Trade Relations**

The EU's unlawful and unfair anti-subsidy investigation measures may also trigger a series of countermeasures, producing negative effects on bilateral trade cooperation and causing long-term repercussions for China-EU relations. Furthermore, the long-standing and deep cooperation between China and the EU in the green sector may be hindered as a result, potentially affecting the China-EU Green Partnership. This is particularly concerning given the EU's recent introduction of new green industry policies, which restrict imports of Chinese green products through trade protection measures.

The China-EU Green Partnership continues to deepen, yet it also faces challenges and difficulties. The EU has blocked China-EU cooperation in its legislative process under the pretext of "de-risking" and "market distortion." (Ke, 2023) The green industry holds significant strategic development importance. It represents a new economic model that will lead the future, a key driver for transforming energy structures, and a crucial opportunity to restructure existing economic sectors and foster new business models. (Sun, 2024) China possesses a mature new energy vehicle (NEV) industrial chain, further reducing production costs, while the EU has energy-saving and emission-reduction targets alongside broad market demand.

### **3.4. The Boomerang Effect: Intensifying Internal Political Divergences within the EU**

This anti-subsidy investigation may also negatively impact the EU's own industries, turning the very companies the EU seeks to protect into victims. Actually, Chinese companies' electric vehicle exports are minimal; two-thirds of electric vehicles imported by the EU from China are manufactured in China by EU and US companies. A substantial portion of China's new energy vehicle exports originate from foreign-funded or joint ventures, such as Renault and BMW, which also benefit from Chinese policy support. EU anti-subsidy measures would impact numerous EU companies operating in China, turning the very enterprises the EU seeks to protect into victims—creating a boomerang effect.

Moreover, EU member states exhibit clear divisions over anti-subsidy duties targeting China, potentially triggering fragmented domestic policies that threaten the EU's political unity and cohesion. Both the German Chancellor and Finance Minister have voiced opposition to imposing tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán stated in media interviews his opposition to punitive tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles.

## **4. CHINA'S COUNTERMEASURES AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS**

In response to the EU's anti-subsidy investigation, China must challenge the legitimacy of the EU's anti-subsidy probe through multiple channels to safeguard its lawful rights and interests. It should actively participate in reshaping international rules, ensuring China's voice is heard in the evolution of global trade regulations. Additionally, China must implement corresponding countermeasures against industrial protection measures by the EU and the US that undermine fair competition, thereby enhancing its toolkit. Finally, China needs to formulate compliant, transparent, and efficient policies to mitigate risks.

### **4.1. Defending Legitimacy through Multilateral and Legal Channels**

As previously noted, the EU's anti-subsidy investigation raises doubts regarding both its legal and factual basis, with the investigation itself being unfair, non-transparent, and violating procedural justice. China can take corresponding measures to challenge these aspects and present its position at the diplomatic level, the level of international law, and the level of international public opinion.

Given the EU's frequent scrutiny of Chinese enterprises, China should conduct an in-depth assessment of the compliance of the EU's anti-subsidy investigation. It should raise objections through bilateral channels or by appealing to WTO bodies and policy review organizations. In response to unfair treatment by the EU, China should also prepare for potential WTO litigation. Should bilateral consultations fail to yield satisfactory results, China may formally file a complaint with the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. Leveraging WTO rules such as the SCM Agreement and GATS as entry points, China could demand a legality review of the EU's anti-subsidy investigations. Additionally, platforms like the Trade Policy Review Mechanism and its oversight procedures could be utilized to discuss relevant issues and articulate China's concerns.

Finally, beyond diplomatic communication and legal challenges, China should actively leverage media platforms to garner public support for global climate cooperation and green transition. Through official media and social media, comprehensively and objectively report China's governmental stance regarding the EU's anti-subsidy investigations against Chinese enterprises. Organize representatives including experts, scholars, and entrepreneurs to conduct in-depth analyses of the legitimacy and implications of the EU's anti-subsidy investigation through publishing professional articles, granting interviews, and hosting seminars.

### **4.2. Active Engagement in International Rule-Making and Reform Processes**

As mentioned earlier, the EU's measures may have spillover effects, triggering a series of combined actions and chain reactions that could have broader and more profound impacts on the global operations and development of Chinese enterprises. Therefore, the Ministry of Commerce and other relevant departments should remain highly vigilant, closely monitoring and studying follow-up measures by the EU and other countries. A robust monitoring and early warning mechanism should be established to track international economic and trade developments in real time.

Moreover, China should not merely respond to the EU's unilateral measures but actively engage in shaping multilateral international rules to mitigate the negative impact of the EU's unilateral actions and restrict its unilateral determination of subsidies. At present, international trade rules are undergoing a critical transformation. (Huang, 2024) Developed economies like Europe and the United States have already initiated the process of reforming these rules and are attempting to secure a dominant position. (Liu, Gong, & Li, 2020) Therefore, relevant departments such as the Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should strengthen inter-departmental cooperation and jointly engage in research on the updating and transformation of rules in the field of international trade. Actively participate in the formulation and negotiation of international economic and trade rules to safeguard the interests of developing countries. (Du, 2022) Subsidy policies in international trade

should allow for flexibility, fully considering a country's stage of economic development, environmental challenges, and developmental needs.

### **4.3. Developing Symmetrical Countermeasures and Enhancing Policy Instruments**

In response to the EU's industrial protection measures, it is necessary to adopt corresponding countermeasures or reciprocal actions. China should continuously refine its legal toolkit by collecting and studying relevant legislative measures and industrial policies from countries like the US and Europe.

At the same time, developed countries are not entirely above reproach, as they also employ various government-led subsidies to gain unfair competitive advantages. Faced with developed countries' double standards on subsidies, China should proactively leverage domestic expertise to thoroughly analyze their subsidy policies and formulate countermeasures. Following the European Commission's draft final ruling, China announced an anti-subsidy investigation into EU dairy products and implemented measures targeting EU pork, brandy, and chemical products.

### **4.4. Improving Domestic Subsidy Policies and Enhancing Policy Governance**

Finally, entering international markets requires refining domestic industrial policies and systems, enhancing compliance efforts, adjusting subsidy implementation methods, and establishing compliant, efficient subsidy policies. China's formal application to join the CPTPP signifies its intention to adopt CPTPP rules, further reform relevant domestic systems, and improve its industrial policies and social credit system.

During policy formulation by central and local finance departments, procedures should be refined to enhance the transparency, enforceability, and stability of subsidy policies. Accelerate reforms to domestic industrial subsidy policies to ensure their rationality and effectiveness. Simultaneously, strengthen performance reviews of subsidies to ensure that subsidy funds genuinely drive industrial development. (Wang, 2023)

Emphasize diversification in subsidy approaches by adopting indirect subsidy methods to mitigate risks. Drawing on the EU's block exemption mechanism, grant subsidy exemptions for sectors including environmental protection, public welfare, scientific research, regional development, poverty alleviation, defense technology, and other strategic industries. Beyond traditional direct fiscal funding and tax incentives, comprehensively utilize financial instruments such as debt financing, insurance, and guarantees.

## **5. CONCLUSION**

Amid the tide of economic globalization, trade disputes and frictions are inevitable. In recent years, profound shifts have occurred in the international balance of power. The collective rise of emerging major powers intertwined with the overall decline of Western nations has formed a distinct trend of “the East rising and the West declining.” Western established powers are unwilling to relinquish their existing positions of power easily, leading to increasingly prominent East-West contradictions within the international community. (Zhao, 2023) Looking ahead, as the global economic landscape undergoes profound adjustments and China's industries continue to expand, we should maintain reasonable expectations while preparing to address various risks and challenges. We must maintain high vigilance and foresight, continuously monitor and study the evolving dynamics of international trade rules, actively participate in reshaping these rules, strengthen support for industries, and drive technological innovation and industrial upgrading. By enhancing the technological sophistication and value-added content of our products, we can boost the competitiveness of China's new energy vehicles

in international markets. This will reduce reliance on external markets and propel economic globalization toward a more open, inclusive, balanced, and mutually beneficial direction.

## REFERENCES

- [1] Du, B. (2022). *Reform of WTO Industrial Subsidy Rules and China's Response*. Wuhan University International Law Review, 6(03), 63–80.
- [2] Wang, M.H. (2023). *Research on China's New Energy Vehicle Industry Policy* (Doctoral dissertation, Jilin University).
- [3] Liu, B., Gong, F.M., & Li, C. C. (2020). *Reform Proposals of WTO Subsidy Rules by the U.S., Japan, and the EU and Their Challenges to China*. International Trade, (02), 57–63.
- [4] Huang, K. E. (2024). *Rethinking the Narrative of International Economic Order Transformation: A Perspective from Subsidy Regulation*. Exploration of International Economics and Trade, 40(07), 105–118.
- [5] Gong, P. M. (2022). *International Competitiveness of China's New Energy Vehicle Industry: Influencing Factors, Characteristics, and Promotion Pathways*. Modern Management Science, (04), 63–72.
- [6] Gao, Y.S., & Jin, T.Y. (2021). *Analysis of China's International Competitiveness in the New Energy Vehicle Industry under the New Situation*. International Economic Cooperation, (04), 65–76.
- [7] Wang, M. (2015). *An Analysis of the Relationship between Fiscal Subsidies and Specific Standards*. Fiscal Research, (11), 10–15.
- [8] Wang, G. (2021). *China's Fiscal Subsidy Policy Space and Coping Strategies under the Background of WTO Reform*. Journal of Shanghai University of International Business and Economics, 28(06), 5–14.
- [9] Jiang, X. (2019). *Discussion on China's New Energy Vehicle Subsidy Policy under the SCM Agreement*. Practice in Foreign Economic and Trade, (06), 29–32.
- [10] Jiang, Y.F. (2022). *The “Externalization” Trend of EU Competition Policy and Its Impact on China-EU Cooperation*. Contemporary World and Socialism, (02), 160–167.
- [11] Ke, J. (2023). *The U.S.-EU “De-risking” Strategy toward China and Its Impact on China*. Pacific Journal, 31(08), 31–44.
- [12] Zhao, G. R. (2023). *From Absorptive Europeanization to Neighborly Europeanization: The Concepts, Methods and Challenges of EU Periphery Security Governance*. Studies of International Politics, 44(04), 60–80, 6–7.
- [13] Sun, Y.H. (2024). *Analysis of the EU's Economic Security Strategy and Its Impact on China: From “Open Strategic Autonomy” to Comprehensive “De-risking”*. Studies on Russia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, (02), 21–43+161.
- [14] Lee, K. (2023). *Bold fiscal policies for a net-zero eu: promotion of electric vehicles and expansion of green energy*. Energy Reports, 10, 2944-2949.
- [15] Park, J. H. (2012). *What determines the specificity of subsidies?* International Studies Quarterly, 56(2), 413-426.
- [16] Diebold, & Nicolas, F. (2011). *Standards of non-discrimination in international economic law*. International & Comparative Law Quarterly, 60(04), 831-865.
- [17] Knez, M., & Obrecht, M. (2017). *Policies for promotion of electric vehicles and factors influencing consumers' purchasing decisions of low emission vehicles*. Journal of Sustainable Development of Energy.